前言
因為IDA F5偽碼編譯不過, 才手工翻譯. 手工翻譯時, 發現有個函數, IDA翻譯的邏輯都錯了(一定會調用的函數都漏掉了), 渣啊. 這多大一個坑啊…, 最基本的信任都沒了. 即時是F5有優化, 那也應該是函數級別的優化, 哪能將函數調用搞沒了. 用的IDA6.8正版.
記錄
反匯編代碼
.text:00011086 HookPRoc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086 proc near.text:00011086 ; DATA XREF: MainProc_114D2+15Eo.text:00011086.text:00011086 var_28 = dWord ptr -28h.text:00011086 var_24 = dword ptr -24h.text:00011086 var_20 = dword ptr -20h.text:00011086 var_1C = dword ptr -1Ch.text:00011086 szSystemProcessName= byte ptr -18h.text:00011086 var_4 = dword ptr -4.text:00011086 arg_0 = dword ptr 8.text:00011086 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch.text:00011086 arg_8 = dword ptr 10h.text:00011086 arg_C = dword ptr 14h.text:00011086 arg_10 = dword ptr 18h.text:00011086 arg_14 = dword ptr 1Ch.text:00011086 arg_18 = dword ptr 20h.text:00011086 arg_1C = dword ptr 24h.text:00011086 arg_20 = dword ptr 28h.text:00011086 arg_24 = dword ptr 2Ch.text:00011086 arg_28 = dword ptr 30h.text:00011086.text:00011086 mov edi, edi.text:00011088 push ebp.text:00011089 mov ebp, esp.text:0001108B sub esp, 28h.text:0001108E mov eax, BugCheckParameter2.text:00011093 xor eax, ebp.text:00011095 mov [ebp+var_4], eax.text:00011098 mov eax, [ebp+arg_C].text:0001109B mov [ebp+var_20], eax.text:0001109E mov eax, [ebp+arg_10].text:000110A1 mov [ebp+var_1C], eax.text:000110A4 mov eax, [ebp+arg_14].text:000110A7 push ebx.text:000110A8 mov ebx, [ebp+arg_8].text:000110AB mov [ebp+var_28], eax.text:000110AE mov eax, [ebp+arg_24].text:000110B1 push esi.text:000110B2 mov esi, [ebp+arg_0].text:000110B5 push edi.text:000110B6 mov edi, [ebp+arg_4].text:000110B9 mov [ebp+var_24], eax.text:000110BC lea eax, [ebp+szSystemProcessName].text:000110BF push eax ; char *.text:000110C0 call GetSystemProcessName_11044.text:000110C5 lea eax, [ebp+szSystemProcessName].text:000110C8 push eax.text:000110C9 push offset Format ; "Rootkit: NewZwQueryDirectoryFile() from"....text:000110CE call DbgPrint.text:000110D3 pop ecx.text:000110D4 pop ecx.text:000110D5 push [ebp+arg_28] ; _DWORD.text:000110D8 push [ebp+var_24] ; _DWORD.text:000110DB push [ebp+arg_20] ; _DWORD.text:000110DE push [ebp+arg_1C] ; _DWORD.text:000110E1 push [ebp+arg_18] ; _DWORD.text:000110E4 push [ebp+var_28] ; _DWORD.text:000110E7 push [ebp+var_1C] ; _DWORD.text:000110EA push [ebp+var_20] ; _DWORD.text:000110ED push ebx ; _DWORD.text:000110EE push edi ; _DWORD.text:000110EF push esi ; _DWORD.text:000110F0 call g_dwOrgZwQueryDirectoryFile_dword_13090.text:000110F6 mov ebx, eax.text:000110F8 test ebx, ebx.text:000110FA jl short loc_11142.text:000110FC mov eax, [ebp+arg_1C].text:000110FF cmp eax, 1.text:00011102 jz short loc_1111D.text:00011104 cmp eax, 2.text:00011107 jz short loc_1111D.text:00011109 cmp eax, 26h.text:0001110C jz short loc_1111D.text:0001110E cmp eax, 3.text:00011111 jz short loc_1111D.text:00011113 cmp eax, 25h.text:00011116 jz short loc_1111D.text:00011118 cmp eax, 0Ch.text:0001111B jnz short loc_11142.text:0001111D.text:0001111D loc_1111D: ; CODE XREF: HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086+7Cj.text:0001111D ; HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086+81j ....text:0001111D push 9.text:0001111F pop ecx.text:00011120 mov edi, offset aCdpassssp ; "cdPassssp".text:00011125 lea esi, [ebp+szSystemProcessName].text:00011128 xor eax, eax.text:0001112A repe cmpsb.text:0001112C jz short loc_11133.text:0001112E sbb eax, eax.text:00011130 sbb eax, 0FFFFFFFFh.text:00011133.text:00011133 loc_11133: ; CODE XREF: HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086+A6j.text:00011133 test eax, eax.text:00011135 jnz short loc_11142.text:00011137 push offset aRootkitDetecte ; "Rootkit: detected file/directory query "....text:0001113C call DbgPrint.text:00011141 pop ecx.text:00011142.text:00011142 loc_11142: ; CODE XREF: HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086+74j.text:00011142 ; HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086+95j ....text:00011142 mov ecx, [ebp+var_4].text:00011145 pop edi.text:00011146 pop esi.text:00011147 mov eax, ebx.text:00011149 xor ecx, ebp.text:0001114B pop ebx.text:0001114C call MakeBSOD.text:00011151 leave.text:00011152 retn 2Ch.text:00011152 HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086 endpIDA F5結果
目標函數最后會調用MakeBSOD, 但是調用MakeBSOD的2個函數, IDA都搞錯了. 我有點明白了, MakeBSOD函數寫法不是標準寫法, 是經過殼處理的, IDA分析錯了. MakeBSOD直接F5, 結果是對的. 但是調用MakeBSOD的函數, IDA分析錯了, 將MakeBSOD的調用直接拿掉了, 而且邏輯完全不對. 那以后用IDA F5分析脫殼后的程序時, 要注意了.
.text:0001165B ; =============== S U B R O U T I N E =======================================.text:0001165B.text:0001165B.text:0001165B MakeBSOD proc near ; CODE XREF: HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086+C6p.text:0001165B ; fnProc_IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL_113EA+DAp.text:0001165B cmp ecx, BugCheckParameter2.text:00011661 jnz short loc_11665.text:00011663 rep retn.text:00011665 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------.text:00011665.text:00011665 loc_11665: ; CODE XREF: MakeBSOD+6j.text:00011665 jmp loc_1166F.text:00011665 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------.text:0001166A db 5 dup(0CCh).text:0001166F ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------.text:0001166F.text:0001166F loc_1166F: ; CODE XREF: MakeBSOD:loc_11665j.text:0001166F mov edi, edi.text:00011671 push ebp.text:00011672 mov ebp, esp.text:00011674 push ecx.text:00011675 mov [ebp-4], ecx.text:00011678 push 0 ; BugCheckParameter4.text:0001167A push BugCheckParameter3 ; BugCheckParameter3.text:00011680 push BugCheckParameter2 ; BugCheckParameter2.text:00011686 push dword ptr [ebp-4] ; BugCheckParameter1.text:00011689 push 0F7h ; BugCheckCode.text:0001168E call ds:KeBugCheckEx.text:0001168E MakeBSOD endp.text:0001168E.text:0001168E ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------void __thiscall MakeBSOD(void *this){ if ( this != (void *)BugCheckParameter2 ) KeBugCheckEx(0xF7u, (ULONG_PTR)this, BugCheckParameter2, BugCheckParameter3, 0);}HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086里面的MakeBSOD調用沒了…
int __stdcall HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6, int a7, int a8, int a9, int a10, int a11){ int v11; // ebx@1 char szSystemProcessName; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-18h]@1 GetSystemProcessName_11044(&szSystemProcessName); DbgPrint("Rootkit: NewZwQueryDirectoryFile() from %s/n", &szSystemProcessName); v11 = g_dwOrgZwQueryDirectoryFile_dword_13090(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9, a10, a11); if ( v11 >= 0 && (a8 == 1 || a8 == 2 || a8 == 38 || a8 == 3 || a8 == 37 || a8 == 12) && !memcmp(&szSystemProcessName, "cdPassssp", 9) ) { DbgPrint("Rootkit: detected file/directory query from virvir process/n"); } return v11;}手工翻譯的正確等價結果
int __stdcall HookProc_ZwQueryDirectoryFile_11086(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6, int a7, int a8, int a9, int a10, int a11){ NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS; WCHAR szSystemProcessName[0x14] = {L'0'}; ULONG_PTR ulBugCheckValue = 0; // ebp // ret addr => ebp + 4 // arg0 => ebp + 8 ULONG_PTR ulEbp = (ULONG_PTR)&a1 - 8; // get ebp addr ulBugCheckValue = ulEbp ^ g_ulBugCheckParameter2; ZeroMemory(szSystemProcessName, sizeof(szSystemProcessName)); GetSystemProcessName_11044(szSystemProcessName); DbgPrint("Rootkit: NewZwQueryDirectoryFile() from %s", szSystemProcessName); // 11 parameters status = g_dwOrgZwQueryDirectoryFile_dword_13090(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9, a10, a11); if (status >= 0) { /* arg_8 is param1 arg_c is param2 arg_10 is param3 arg_14 is param4 arg_18 is param5 arg_1c is param6 // ... */ // IDA F5將arg_1c翻譯成a8, 實際上應該是a6..., 最基本的信任呢... // a6 is FileInformation if ((FileDirectoryInformation == a6) || (FileFullDirectoryInformation == a6) || (FileIdFullDirectoryInformation == a6) || (FileBothDirectoryInformation == a6) || (FileIdBothDirectoryInformation == a6) || (FileNamesInformation == a6)) { if (0 != memcmp(szSystemProcessName, "cdPassssp", 9)) { DbgPrint("Rootkit: detected file/directory query from virvir process/n"); } } } MakeBSOD(ulBugCheckValue ^ ulEbp); return status;}
